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State Discretion Under New Federal
Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality
and a Federalism-Based
Constitutional Challenge
by
Candice Hoke
Echoing a widely-held
opinion of state options under the
new Welfare regime, Peter
Edelman recently wrote that under
the new federal welfare statute,1
the states "can now do almost
anything they want.' 2  Edelman
resigned from his federal
administrative office in protest
over President Clinton's signing of
the legislation. Edelman's
resignation was an expression of
the degree of concern that he felt
not only about substantive changes
in the federal welfare law but also
about the delegation of significant
policy and procedural control to
The Act limits state's
decision-making
process so as to ensure
that states must
exercise discretion in
accordance with policy
norms embedded in
the federal legislation.
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constitutional federalism issues and has included numerous
studies on federal preemption, the Tenth Amendment, the
Supremacy Clause and the Spending Clause. This article
benefited from the reflective responses offered by other panelists
and program organizers of the American Bar Association's
Section on State and Local Government Law, Panel on
Devolution of Power at the ABA Annual Meeting, August 6,
1997, namely Mary Massaron Ross, William P. Marshall, David
DeVries, Robert Freilich, and Steve Szlay. For beneficial
critical commentary, she would like to thank Jim Wilson, Alan
Weinstein, Pat McCoy George Taylor, and Mel Durchslag.
Maurice Graham provided effective research assistance.
structured state
the states. He joins many others in
expressing grave concern over the
prospect of state governments'
exercising this broad discretion over
the interests of indigent families.
3
This apprehension may be well-
founded, as the Personal
Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (the "PRWORA" or the "Act")
does, at least on its face, grant the
states scores of options in
structuring programs that substitute
for more traditional welfare
measures.
4
The extent, however, to which
the federal government has in fact
choices under welfare reform has
received far less attention. These restrictions may,
unfortunately, have more impact upon former welfare
recipients than the Act's alleged latitude because the
most significant and fundamental policy decisions have
already been dictated at the federal level through
incentive structures embedded in the Act. State
discretion is largely located in the implementation of
federal policy norms, in the handling of peripheral
matters, or in the creation of "segregated" state programs
permitted to achieve different objectives without federal
funding.5 Where the PRWORA grants states what
appears to be more meaningful policy discretion, careful
analysis reveals that these options are weighted by
substantial financial or other penalties. The Act limits
state's decision-making process so as to ensure that states
must exercise discretion in accordance with policy norms
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embedded in the federal legislation. For this reason, the
PRWORA should not be understood as a neutral federal
block grant program that cedes the important decisions to
states in an impartial manner. Rather, through its
technical, financial detail, the Act operationally transfers
control of new and important areas of policy traditionally
left to the state to the federal government.
This article challenges the common characterization
of the 1996 welfare reforms. States do not have the
ability to do "almost anything they want."' 6 Most notably,
states with more compassionate political leadership who
wish to counter the national trend may seek areas of
flexibility in vain. The Act's mandates and penalties will
force all states into particular policies that they may not
have chosen had Edelman been correct about the range of
their discretionary powers.
Edelman's critique typifies the standard assessment
of the Act.7 According to the prevailing view, the Act's
policies are objectionable because the federal government
has capped the money it will make available for welfare
spending, while concomitantly eliminating the personal
entitlement to assistance! In so doing, the nation has
ceded programmatic responsibility to the states via block
grants so that states may structure and operate welfare
programs as they choose.9
This article first provides a descriptive outline of the
structure of the PRWORA, emphasizing provisions that
accord the states new discretionary powers. In contrast,
this article then shows by close attention to the details of
the Act that the discretion afforded states is often
illusory. In practice, the Act constrains states by
subjecting their purportedly discretionary policy
decisions to conservative policy norms.'0 Given the
length of the Act, this examination must be illustrative
rather than exhaustive.
Finally, this article demonstrates that states and
their citizens need not passively accept these normative
federal policy choices. Concerned state governments
may make at least two distinct types of efforts to mend
the social safety net. The first type of effort makes use of
opportunities embedded in the interstices of the Act
itself, e.g., the statutory waivers granted under the
previous Aid to Families With Dependent Children
("AFDC") regime." The second type of effort consists of
legal challenges to the Act. Some jurisdictions and
individuals have already filed claims predicated upon
individual rights theories such as Equal Protection and
Fifth Amendment Due Process.12 Because these areas of
legal analysis have already received attention, this article
focuses instead on Tenth Amendment and Spending
Clause claims. Such analysis reveals that significant
portions of the Act may be subject to invalidation under
the Spending Clause,' 3 as informed by the values of the
Tenth Amendment, which reserves for the states those
powers 'not expressly delegated to the federal
government. 
4
L OVERVIEW OF THE PRWORA
In 1996, the federal government abolished its half-
century commitment to income and other support for
indigent 'families. The PRWORA states Congress's
desire to "promote" the interests of children, of
"responsible motherhood and fatherhood," and of a
"successful society."'15 It is certainly worth questioning
whether the Act can achieve its broadly stated political
objectives without causing significant negative
consequences.' 6 Stripped of its rhetoric, the Act achieves
the following: (1) sharp reductions in federal financial
commitments for indigent families and individuals,
including, children; (2) the creation of a federally
supervise, state-based automated system for ensuring
payment of child support, and federal reimbursement for
outlays t9 an unsupported family; (3) the termination of
individual entitlements to federal welfare benefits
program, the creation of a lifetime maximum period of
federally finded benefits, and a legal requirement that
recipients work; and (4) the elimination of federal
financial support for disabled and impoverished legal
immigrants.
A. TITLE I: TANF's "TOUGH LOVE" OR "TOUGH
LUgk"
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
program ("TANF")' 7 replaces AFDC.' AFDC provided
cash payments to indigent families based upon national
eligibility' standards and a uniform federal definition
which created an entitlement for recipients. While the
states dicl provide vastly different benefit levels to
indigents, they were forbidden from tinkering with the
qualifications for eligibility. Before the passage of the
PRWORA, deep political opposition to AFDC existed, in
part due to widespread media images of "welfare queens"
accused of welfare fraud and other forms of abuse of tax
dollars.
In its substantive provisions, TANF eliminates
national eligibility standards and abolishes the national
entitlement to aid. It replaces the AFDC's open-ended
federal financial liability with finite grants awarded to
states upon submission of a complete "State Plan."19
States are not required to provide cash payments, as they
were under AFDC, but may instead employ new
programsto assist indigent families.20
With TANF, Congress seeks to create a work-based
support system that will facilitate the movement of
families with minor children out of the welfare system
and into unsubsidized, self-supporting employment To
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this end, the Act authorizes states to use funds for
traditional forms of support such as cash and other
assistance for housing, utilities, and other necessaries of
life. 21 Unlike under the previous system, however, the
states may also choose to fund programs providing job
skills training, job search skills, child care services, and
other activities designed to help indigent families become
self-sufficient The specific features of state programs
that may be funded in part by TANF monies appear to be
matters of broad state discretion. Indeed, the Act
provides that a state may use the TANF grant "in any
manner . . . reasonably calculated to accomplish the
purpose of this part." Commentators often overlook the
significance of the multiple restrictions that are imposed
upon the states.
Like AFDC, TANF is structured as a "cooperative
federalism" program, in which the federal and state
governments contribute to the programmatic standards,
procedures, and funding.23 A state desiring to receive
federal monies must file a plan outlining its programs
and the manner in which they achieve TANF's express
objectives. 24  A state must also continue to provide
substantial funding of its own, which is measured by any
financial reductions in a state's "historic effort."25 The
plan must include state decisions regarding various
policy options that TANF explicitly accords the states,
such as whether to require recipients to perform
"community service" within two months of receiving
assistance.
2 6
Many states already have authorization for
innovative, experimental programs that significantly
depart from the historic AFDC program through
permissions, or "waivers," granted by the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"). 27 If a state's
waivers for its current welfare programs had previously
released it from the strictures of federal law, its plan must
indicate which waivers, if any, it has chosen to continue
to enforce.28 The state's plan must also address how the
waivers may be "inconsistent" with TANF statutory
provisions. 9 TANF explicitly accords states operating
under previously approved waivers the ability to continue
such programs until their expiration, regardless of
inconsistency with TANF.
B. TITLE M: A FEDERALLY MANDATED APPARATUS
FOR COLLECTING CHILD SUPPORT
The nonpayment of child support orders is a
significant cause of poverty for a single-parent families.3 °
Title I of the PRWORA details a mandatory child
support collection structure that must be established and
operated if a state is to remain eligible for the full TANF
grant 31 Key features of Title I include the creation of
automated State systems for entry of all support orders
and of employees who obtain new jobs; authority for
income withholding; a requirement that states cooperate
with the federal government and with other states in
matching employees to outstanding support orders;
mechanisms for speedy enforcement of support orders;
and the enactment of certain laws and legal conditions,
including the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and
the conferral of statewide jurisdiction on agencies and
courts empowered to act in paternity and support
proceedings.
32
The Act specifies that applicants for TANF
assistance and Medicaid must assign support rights,
including distribution, to the state and cooperate in
establishing paternity.33 - The state must deduct a
minimum of twenty-five percent from a family's cash
assistance grant, and may end the family's eligibility for
grants altogether, for "non-cooperation" in establishing
paternity, or ff a child support order is modified or
unenforced without good cause.3 4 Additionally, ff the
federal government finds that states are not enforcing
non-cooperation sanctions against individuals, the state
will be penalized up to five percent of the TANF block
grant for the next fiscal year.35 Finally, the federal
government receives first priority for reimbursement
from child support money collected from absent fathers,
and the states may collect the remainder, or may return it
to the indigent family.
C. TITLE V: PROVISIONS GOVERNING IMMIGRANTS
Budget pressures, and political calculations about
the inability of some AFDC recipients to vote, led
Congress to target both legal and illegal immigrants for
some of the sharpest restrictions and prohibitions on
receipt of federally funded benefits. 36 Legal immigrants
stood accused of taking advantage of preferences in
immigration law to bring aging relatives to the United
States, where entitlement programs paid the costs of their
relatives' care. Additionally, Congress professed grave
concern that generous benefit programs were attracting
illegal immigrants. Welfare reform was designed, at
least in part, to remove or reverse those perceived
incentives, despite the law's profound and harsh effects
upon the lives of immigrants. Not surprisingly, the
provisions found in the immigration section of the Act
have received sustained criticism. This criticism resulted
in the partial restoration of benefits to some groups of
immigrants under the Federal Budget Reconciliation
Bill.
37
Title IV of the PRWORA bars 'legal aliens from
receiving assistance from two federal programs that
provide basic necessities of life: food stamps and
Supplemental Security Income ("ssr'). SSI is frequently
used to pay for disabled persons' living costs in nursing
VOLUME 9:1 1998
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or other group homes. The removal of SSI benefits
means that these legal immigrants will also lose
Medicaid coverage, unless their state is willing to include
them in another eligibility category.38 The law has some
exceptions, such as for lawful permanent residents who
have worked in the United States ten years or more.39
The Act permits states the option to continue some
benefits to legal immigrants who were in the country
before the bill was passed.40 Legal immigrants arriving
here after enactment of the bill are prohibited from
receiving means-tested public benefits funded partially or
wholly with federal monies for the first five years of their
residency.41  Thereafter, states may provide or deny
services to this population in accordance with other
restrictions on their provision of benefits.42
D. THE BALANCE OF THE ACT: MECHANISMS TO
REDUCE FEDERAL COSTS
While every title of the Act is aimed at least in part
at reducing the federal financial commitment to
entitlement programs, some portions are almost
exclusively dedicated to this end. For instance, SSI for
disabled children is now more stringent.43 All new
applicants, as well as some current beneficiaries, must be
reassessed in light of new definitions of disabilities."
The Act also narrowed the availability of school lunch
and other child nutrition programs, and the food stamp
program.
IlL UNI-DIRECTIONAL "FLEXIBILITY" FOR
STATES
The radical revisions in federal welfare programs
enacted in 1996 were explicitly predicated upon the
normative objective of "increas[ing] the flexibility of
states '45 in designing and operating public assistance
programs for indigent families.46  In addition to
supporting the Act's substantive programmatic changes,
proponents underscored the devolution of significant
regulatory power from the federal government to the
states. Given the sharply reduced federal financial
commitment to these programs over the six years of
authorization, 47 and the rhetorical emphasis upon
devolution of power, it is sensible to conclude that federal
block grants do indeed provide states "flexibility" in
fashioning programs, eligibility, and benefits. One might
expect that the Act would remain neutral as to the states'
efforts so long as certain basic goals, e.g., adequate child
nutrition, were met.
The PRWORA systematically embraces particular
normative values and policy choices, and weights these
values for states through the imposition of substantial
penalties. Furthermore, where the Act awards states
greater flexibility, it typically permits them to move only
118
in a direction consistent with embedded, hard-nosed
federal norms. In the Act, there are a few opportunities
for states to move in a more compassionate direction.
But before a state may exercise these opportunities,
Congress 1 has usually saddled them with onerous
procedural! hurdles or a risk of financial penalties.48
A. IDEOLOGICALLY CONSERVATIVE FEDERAL
MANDATES CONTROL THE WELFARE PROGRAMS
ADMINISTERED BY STATES
Despite the much-heralded programmatic
flexibility, !the PRWORA imposes numerous burdensome
and expensive federal requirements on the states. In the
TANF program alone, restrictive mandates control the
manner in which recipients may find and retain work.
TANF mandates that the "work participation" rate of
recipient families increase over the six-year funding
period, and culminates in a requirement that fifty percent
of recipient families have one working adult by the year
2002.50 I State non-compliance with the work
participati6n rates will result in sanctions in the form of
reduced TANE grant monies.5
TANF also limits the kinds of activities that
recipients may perform and be considered "working" for
purposes of the state's participation rate. For example,
some educational activities designed to prepare
individuals to succeed in seeking and retaining work do
not constitute "work" for satisfaction of the federal
standard.52  TANF specifies the number of hours per
month that an individual must work to be count as a
"working" recipient. 3 States must require a parent or
caretaker in a family receiving TANF aid to work within
twenty-four months of receiving aid. 4 Unless it opts out,
the state must also require a parent or caretaker to
undertake community service within two months of
receiving assistance. Other key TANF provisions insist
that states ' develop programs to reduce the incidence of
various so'cial problems identified by conservatives as
causal factors for poverty. In particular, states must
design programs to reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies,
56
especially those of teenagers, and must attempt to reduce
statutory ripe.
57
In one of the most dramatic departures from prior
policy, the PRWORA sets a maximum lifetime limit on
TANF assistance to adults of sixty months, starting when
the state plan takes effect.5 ' The Act permits states to
exempt families for hardship reasons, including
battering, but the total number of exemptions may not
exceed twenty percent of the total cases of families
receiving TANF-funded assistance.59  The lifetime
maximum includes not only cash assistance but also any
assistance provided under the range of innovative
programs 'that states are encouraged to provide.
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
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Participation in any state program even partially funded
with TANF money, such as child care, job counseling or
skills training, emergency assistance, and home heating
will use part of an adult recipient's sixty-month
allotment, even if the individual is satisfying all work
requirements and still receives an income below the
poverty range. 1 however, the assistance derives from a
"segregated" state or local program exclusively funded by
nonfederal monies, the time enrolled in the program will not
count toward the sixty-month maximum. 60 Importantly, if
any adult in the family has reached the sixty-month limit,
regardless of whether the debarred adult is seeking
assistance, the entire family automatically becomes
ineligible for any TANF-funded assistance.61
Thus, PRWORA contains a number of highly
restrictive and punitive mandates that enforce
compliance by state welfare programs receiving partial
funding from the federal government 6 2 Although the
work mandates are perhaps the most serious restrictions,
other provisions also impose penalties that the states are
required to assess against non-complying recipients.6 3
For example, states "shall," subject to good cause or other
exceptions the state may establish, reduce the amount of
assistance payable to a family, or terminate the family's
assistance altogether, for adult family members who are not
complying with work requirements." Additionally, the
PRWORA imposes food-stamp work requirements for able-
bodied adults, in addition to TANF work requirements,65
denies eligibility for food stamps if a member of the
household is an employee of the federal, state or local
government and on strike," and sets a maximum period of
eligibility for food stamps on unemployed adults who are not
raising children: three months in any thirty-six month
period.67 The welfare reforms also insist that teenage
parents must attend high school or be barred from TANF
assistance and live in "adult-supervised settings.'"" The
PRWORA's restrictions extend to bar legal and illegal aliens
from receiving many benefits and services. 69 The Act also
invades the sanctity of poor families by mandating that states
revise family law and procedural structures governing child
support orders and enforcement according to the details
prescribed in the Act, and requiring that any recipient
entitled to receive child support assign that right to the
state.
70
Whatever the merits of programmatic welfare
reform may be, the timing of PRWORA made it
impossible for Congress to receive either the evaluative
studies of state innovations authorized by the HHS under
its statutory waiver authority, 71 or the results of
experiments in the profoundly underfunded Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training ("JOBS")
program7 and Family Support Act of 1988.73  The
PRWORA incorporated more extreme versions of some
of the experimental state strategies, such as broad-based
work requirements for recipients, but it adopted them
before those programs had been adequately tested by
experience.
B. STATE OPTIONS FOR MORE CONSERVATIVE
PoLIcy DEcIsIONs
Although the federal policies articulated and
mandated by the PRWORA are pervasively
conservative,74 the Act goes beyond simple mandates.
The PRWORA is replete with both explicit invitations
and authorization for states to embrace aggressively
punitive policy positions. These policies may be grouped
into five overlapping categories:75 (1) the reduction or
elimination of public assistance for a family as a result of
the actions of one family member;76 (2) restrictions
prohibiting legal immigrants from receipt of public
assistance;77 (3) policies singling out felonious drug
offenders for further restrictions;78 (4) the imposition of
additional intrusions upon the privacy of recipients,
specifically in drug testing mandates; 79 and (5) financial
incentives for reducing Medicaid eligibility.8"
In theory, the latitude allegedly granted to states
under these authorizations represents the "devolution" of
power in which states are granted authentic
programmatic flexibility. One should query, however,
why the options that are suggested and rewarded are
consistently more parsimonious and punitive than the
Act's default positions. States are rarely provided with
incentives, encouragement or concrete suggestions to
exercise compassion, or to allow consideration of a
recipient's life circumstances, in excess of the bare
minimum written into the Act.8'
C. CONTROL OF STATE DECISIONS THROUGH
ONEROUS PROCEDURAL HURDLES
The PRWORA typically does not specify which
state officer or branch of government is empowered to
speak for the state. If a state chooses to embrace a
federally disfavored policy choice, however, the Act
departs from this practice, requiring a decision by special
enactment of state legislation.8 2 Thus, state legislative
enactment is required for illegal immigrants 3 or
convicted drug offenders8 4 to receive any state or local
welfare benefits. Thus, procedural mechanisms create
political hurdles that make it difficult for state
governments to provide these benefits.
D. CONTROL OF STATE DECISIONS THROUGH
FUNDING RESTRICTIONS AND PENALTIES
Under the repealed AFDC law, the federal
government assumed an open-ended financial
responsibility for matching state expenditures for poverty
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programs. The PRWORA's substitution of fixed federal
block grants will have several effects on state policy-
making. States will no longer have the promise of
increased federal funds as an incentive for greater outlays
of state dollars. Those primarily concerned about the
fiscal soundness of the federal and state governments
undoubtedly view this new policy as a salutary
improvement. For those who are concerned about the
steady shrinkage of welfare benefits relative to the cost of
living over the past two decades, the loss of federal
incentives for spending is worrisome.
The Act's new funding structure checks state
impulses to reduce poverty funding by mandating that
states must meet "maintenance of effort" ("MOE")
funding requirements.85 A state will not meet the MOE
requirements if it spends less than seventy-five percent of
the state's previous spending for the target period.8 6 This
requirement may help to prevent a "race to the bottom"
between states, as they could compete for the lowest level
of welfare benefits.8 7 Under the new law, for instance, a
state choosing to continue benefits for legal immigrants,
may count these costs towards the satisfaction of its
MOE.88
Generally, states will not be free to use block grant
money as they wish. Restrictions imposed by the Act
assume two basic forms. First, state compliance with the
federal mandates will be very expensive. Work
participation rate requirements will be especially costly to
meet. The administrative, training, and support
apparatus required to identify and place recipients in jobs
is notoriously expensive-much more costly than simply
giving recipients a monthly benefit check.8 9 Satisfaction
of the work participation requirements, particularly as
they increase over time, will require huge amounts of
state investment. The Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that federal funding is at least twelve billion
dollars less than what is needed to fund the work
requirements alone.9° Child care, needed so that adults
can work under the Act's mandates, is also federally
underfunded by at least one billion dollars.9' In most
states, qualification for the full TANF grant is likely to
take priority over other types of benefits. Particularly
during recessions, states' desire to comply with work
requirements will likely result in substantial pressure for
states to spend resources either to move recipients into
paying jobs, a difficult task in economic downturns, or to
artificially reduce the TANF population.
A second restriction on state use of block grant
funds takes the form of financial penalties explicitly set
forth in the PRWORA for state noncompliance with
certain provisions. Chiefly, these penalties are exacted
through reductions in the TANF block grant that would
otherwise be available to the state.92
If state governments succumb to federal pressure on
key welfare policy decisions, we should acknowledge that
the original, and fundamental, policy choices were in fact
made by I the federal government, and that these are
enforced through a variety of sometimes indirectly stated,
but very real, sanctions. A compassionate state is
therefore forced to bargain with the devil: to qualify for
the multi-million TANF funds, a state must accept the
programmatic proscriptions of the federal government,
however much the state may disagree with the policy
determinations. No state could possibly support its anti-
poverty programs without federal dollars, so each must
instead try to find routes which minimize the impact of
the most damaging, and politically directive, federal
policies.
DI STATE OPTIONS FOR MENDING THE
SAFETY NET
Obviously, states cannot completely repair the
gaping hole left by the abolition of national eligibility
standar for need-based poverty programs. But, they
may undertake several strategies for sidestepping the
federally imposed welfare requirements: first, by
operating within powers that PRWORA accords to state
governments and second, through mounting challenges
to potentially unconstitutional aspects of the Act.93
I
A. OPTIONS WITHIN PRWORA
State governments, ironically enough, are now the
first line Iof defense against the incursion of simplistic,
and potentially destructive, federal poverty policies. Due
to disparities in their economies, the concentration of
indigent 'advocacy groups, or the nature of political
leadership, some states are now better positioned than
others to mend the holes in federal welfare safety nets.
It is not necessary to belabor the point that states
may rejeot federal invitations for more punitive policies
than the mandates require. Indeed, a National
Governor's Association study demonstrates that relatively
few states have responded to a number of these punitive,
conservative TANF options.94 State plans may, of
course, be freely amended. Thus, advocacy groups
should not assume that these battles have been won with
any finality.
A second method for bypassing some of the Act's
requirements is the continued operation of section 1115
waivers approved by HIS prior to August 22, 1996.95 A
waiver, a]s discussed earlier, preempts any "inconsistent"
PRWORA provisions.96 Many states have waivers in
place which specify more generous time limits for
location of work, for exemptions or exceptions from
working, lor which provide broader definitions of "work"
activities! 97  States may continue waivers that provide
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greater flexibility and more tools for addressing the
complexities of poverty. Since the waiver system will not
result in the disqualification of recipients or states from
the federal program, the waiver system provides states
the opportunity to take advantage of one of the few
portions of the Act which truly, if grudgingly, supports
state experimentation and initiative.9
A third option for states stemming from language in
the Act is the creation of "segregated" programs not
funded by TANF or other federal dollars.9 These
programs will, obviously, be more expensive to states
than those permitted to receive TANF dollars. States
have the greatest programmatic latitude in this area.10 °
Additionally, if these segregated programs assist TANF
populations, or provide assistance towards goals specified
in the Act, state expenditures will count, as noted above,
towards the state's MOE requirement.'10
B. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO PRWORA
Some litigation has already been filed which
challenges the constitutionality of key portions of the
PRWORA, such as those sections limiting the benefits
eligibility of legal immigrants. These cases typically
allege violations of the equal protection'02 or due process
clauses. 10 3 Thus far, however, there has been little
attention to structural constitutional theories, which
could potentially invalidate a larger portion of the Act
than individual rights arguments. This article is
particularly concerned with the structural claim that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Spending Power,
as informed by Tenth Amendment values. 4
In light of the Supreme Court's resuscitation of
federalism and its revival of Tenth Amendment
justiciability, significant constitutional issues may be
raised by federal incursions upon the powers traditionally
delegated to states. '05 Although the Court has yet to
reconsider, and explicitly limit, its federally-deferential
Spending Power doctrine, its demonstrated willingness to
overturn other constitutional precedents that undermine
federalism' °6  suggest that the 'traditionally
uncircunscribed scope of the Spending Power may soon
be constricted in those cases where it impairs the
autonomy or effective operation of state governments.
Before the recent case, New York v. United States,
the Tenth Amendment was interpreted as a residuary
clause.107 The Supreme Court first examined whether a
challenged federal statute fell within the scope of any
power delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution.108 If, for instance, the statute implicated
the commerce power, the Court then analyzed the
potential for Commerce Clause challenge.1°9 Federalist
values, whether they were implied in the constitutional
structure or embedded in the Tenth Amendment, did not
modify the inquiry. If the Court found that the statute
was a valid exercise of a delegated power, the
constitutional scrutiny ended without a separate Tenth
Amendment inquiry. As this author explained in an
earlier writing, "[a]s a residuary provision, the
Amendment protected as powers reserved to the states
and individuals all those not delegated to the nation;
nothing further was left to adjudicate as a matter of the
Tenth Amendment.""
0
The Court fundamentally altered this doctrinal
inquiry in New York. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court held that the Tenth Amendment, like the First and
Fifth Amendments, subjects even the enumerated federal
powers to certain constraints."' The resulting inquiry is
now "whether an incident of State sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power."
112
Although the Court did not explicitly acknowledge the
constitutional transformation it effected through this
subtle doctrinal modification, the result is that
affirmative limits now exists upon the exercise of
national powers, including those expressly delegated io
the national government."
3
Although New York dealt with intersection of the
commerce power and Tenth Amendment, and not with
the scope of the Spending Clause, 1 4 its central
proposition analogously applies to the Spending Clause.
Under this analysis, congressional power under the
Spending Clause may transgress constitutional values of
state autonomy and sovereignty.
Under pre-New York Spending Clause precedent
the Supreme Court has cautioned that a regulatory
program will offend the Constitution when its incentives
to adopt national policy become so "coercive" of state
participation that it "pass[es] the point at which 'pressure
turns into compulsion.'1 5 -The PRWORA contains
numerous features overtly designed to coerce state
participation in compliance with its regulatory goals, and
thus raises constitutional questions even under the
existing inquiry. For instance, the sheer size of the block
grants available to states, and the dependence of state
budgets on federal anti-poverty monies, raise the specter of
potentially unconstitutional "coercion."
Yet, despite repeated admonitions, the Court has
not yet invalidated any federal regulatory program as
ultra vires to the Spending Clause. Its deferential
standards of review, articulated most directly in South
Dakota v. Dole, remain intact." 6  This doctrinal
persistence may derive from the lack of justiciable
standards regarding the point at which "carrots" become
"sticks," that is, when incentives are sufficiently
influential as to be unconstitutionally "coercive."' 17 -
Thus far, then, Dole seems merely a bark without a
meaningful bite.1 s But, in light of New York, Printz v.
VOLUME 9:1 1998
HeinOnline  -- 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 121 1998
CANDICE HOKE
United States,' 9 and other recent cases which establish
the Court's new openness to enforcing limitations upon
federal legislation which threatens federalism,120 it seems
reasonable to hope that the Court may reevaluate the
Spending Power precedent.12 1 New scholarly arguments
that offer judicially manageable criteria for demarcation
of proper and improper uses of the Spending Power may
also strengthen the Court's resolve to reassess this
precedent.
Professor Lynn Baker has advanced a thoughtful
approach grounded in the reconciliation of
two potentially conflicting goals. [The
approach] must strive to safeguard state
autonomy and the related principle of a federal
government of enumerated powers by
restricting Congress from using conditional
offers of federal funds in ways that it could not
directly mandate. [Yet] it must preserve for
Congress a power to spend that is greater and
broader than its power to regulate the states
directly.1
22
The doctrinal approach Baker suggests presumes
the constitutional invalidity of a scheme in which a
state's acceptance of the federal government's offer of
funds allows the federal government to regulate states in
ways that Congress cannot directly mandate under its
Article I powers. Baker proposes that the presumption of
invalidity be rebuttable-if the offer of funds were indeed
found to be "reimbursement" rather than "regulatory"
spending.123 Reimbursement spending is permissible,
and occurs through enactments that specify the purpose
for which the states are to expend federal dollars,
reimbursing the states, in whole or in part, for
expenditures.124 By contrast, regulatory spending is not
narrowly tailored; it specifies conditions that states must
fulfill to be eligible for federal funds, and permits
virtually "any amount of money to be made contingent
upon a state's compliance with a given condition."' 5
Some examples drawn from the PRWORA make
the implications of this constitutional challenge more
clear. To qualify for TANF funds, a state must certify
that it "will operate a child support enforcement
program" consistent with the requirements mandated by
the PRWORA's Title rn. 26 Title I itself offers little
money for the states, but is pervaded by highly intrusive
regulatory mandates requiring the complete restructuring
of state administrative structures for issuance and
modification of child support orders. Compliance with
this portion of PRWORA requires at least thirty separate
legislative changes in every State127-a virtual
"commandeering" of the states' legislative judgments as
to the best system for their adjudication and enforcement
of child support.12
Applying Professor Baker's test, we find that those
TANF funding offers that Congress has made to the
states that incorporate regulatory mandates, e.g., the
creation and enforcement of a child support enforcement
apparatus that complies with Title HI, far exceed the
enumerated powers that Congress may exercise pursuant
to its Article I powers. This reasoning leads to the
conclusion that much of TANF is invalid. The
presumption of invalidity is rebuttable, however, and the
second step in the inquixy is a two-prong inquiry of (1)
whether the funds are offered for a particular purpose,
and (2) wlether federal monies are in fact reimbursement1 29
for state spending towards that goal.' TANF funds are
offered for a wide range of regulatory purposes, 30 but
reimbursement for the costs of overhauling and operating
a state child support system so that it will become
nationally uniform is not an articulated purpose of the
funds.131 Rather, states are required to surrender an area
of traditional state jurisdiction-the creation and
maintenance of a system to determine, enforce and
collect appropriate child support. Under this doctrinal
approach, i then, TANF may be viewed as an
unconstitutional exercise of the Spending Power.
Similarly,i because some federal funds are offered to
states und6r the Child Support Enforcement title, and are
not tailored as a reimbursement for state spending that
enables states to comply with federal mandates, Title rn
may also be invalid.
Thus, for states willing to assert the constitutional
values of federalism and searching for mechanisms by
which to slow the incursion of destructive and deplorable
federal welfare rules, a Spending Clause challenge claim
may be highly effective.
132
IV. CONCLUSION
Thel publicly vaunted devolution of federal
responsibility for welfare programs is more a rhetorical
ploy than, reality. The federal government has, through
explicit mandates, financial penalties and other
mechanisms, ensured that pre-defined policy
commitments must be the primary objectives of state
programs. In addition, the PRWORA requires states to
appropriate significant new funds to serve federally
defined objectives. Depending upon the economic and
political situation of an individual state, these funding
requirements may deplete the monies available for state
welfare programs chosen by its political institutions and
citizens.
The 'continuation of waiver initiatives may provide
one mechanism for avoidance of some of the Act's more
troubling: features. States may also wish to use non-
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federal funds to create more compassionate, effective
welfare programs than those specifically authorized by
federal law. States should also consider a Spending
Clause challenge, which, if successful, will relieve states
and their recipients of the burden of compliance with the
Act, in whole or part. Spending Clause litigation
inspired by New York may also reduce the likelihood that
future federal enactments could coerce states into
adopting homogenous, political orthodoxy prescribed by
the federal government
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states with more generous benefit levels, see Note, Devolving
Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109
HAv. L. RPv. 1984, pas'm (1996). For other perspectives, see
Mark Greenberg, Racing to the Bottom? Recent State Welfare
Initiatives Present Cause for Concern (1996) (last visited Nov. 23,
1997) (available at <http'/www.epnorgclasplrace.html>)
(suggesting that imposing a maximum cap of years on receiving
benefits will probably spur a greater movement of recipients
between states than has previously been seen); see Lucy Williams,
supra note 5 (citing literature establishing that recipients do not
migrate between states for higher benefits).
" See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Policy
Announcement, No. TANF-ACF-PA-97-1 at 9 (Jan. 31, 1997)
<httpJAvww.acEdhhs.gov/progmms/ofalguidej31.htm>. This policy
announcement allayed many concerns about whether the federal
government would exercise programmatic control over states
regarding which programs would count towards a state MOE
requirement The policy reserves control over work participation
rates, but is more inclusive about pennitting states to count in their
efforts towards federally disfavored population groups, such as legal
and illegal immigrants.
' The annual cost of requiring a recipient to engage in community
service work has been estimated to average $6000, including
administrative costs and child care. Perhaps it is not surprising,
then, that states have not chosen to require community service in
exchange for benefits eligibility, as it would require substantial net
increases in funding to do so.
90 See Edelman, supra note 2, at 50. In light of the August 1997
appropriations, this estimated shortage may have changed
somewhat
"' Id. In light of the August 1997 appropriations and technical
corrections to the PRWORA, this figure may have diminished
somewhat
92 All of the following penalties are found in 42 U.S.CA § 609
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(West 1997). Failure to satisfy minimum work participation rates
will result in an initial reduction of five percent in the TANF grant
and an increase in MOE expenditures from 75% to 80% of a state's
historic effort. There will be a reduction of up to 21% for
succeeding failures, § 609(aX3). The Secretary of BHS is
permitted some discretion in assessing the size of the penalty, based
on the degree of noncompliance and whether the offender qualifies
as a 'needy" state. See 42 U.S.CA § 603(bX6) (West 1997).
Failure to establish the child support enforcement apparatus and to
comply with the rules for establishing paternity and collecting and
distributing child support receives a reduction of five percent 42
U.S.C. §609(aX5) (West 1997). Failure to maintain MOE
spending, results in up to a five percent loss. Id. at §609(aX7).
Failure to comply with the five year maximum lifetime limit on
TANF benefits for adults, results in a reduction of up to five
percent Id. at § 609(aX9). Failure to maintain assistance for an
adult with a child under six who lacks child care results in a
reduction of up to five percent Id. at §609(aXl 1).
93 A third strategy is to press for federal statutory change through
the various organizations of state governments, e.g., the National
Governor's Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and other pressure
groups.
94 See National Governors Association, Summary of Selected
Elements of State Plans for Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANM), Apr. 3, 1997 <httpJ/www.ngaorg>. The
summary reviews 41 State Plans submitted under TANF, 38 of
which had been certified as "complete," the last step in the BHS
review process before disbursement of the block grant Of these,
only three states had chosen to implement a comriunity service
requirement after two months of benefits. Eighteen states have
adopted time limits for TANF benefits shorter than the 60 months
permitted under federal law but most of these states include
extensions and exemptions more liberal than federal law, thus
relaxing the severity of the time limits. With regard to interstate
migrants, 30 states chose to apply their own benefit standards.
Legal immigrants ("qualified aliens") are entitled to continue their
TANF benefits in 38 states; only three states have decided not to
provide benefits to non-citizens. Drug testing of applicants will not
be performed in 33 of the states, and only two states have chosen to
test applicants, the balance have either not decided this policy point
or did not relate the decision in their State Plan.
95 A "section 1115 waiver" refers to the authority granted under
the Social Security Act for the federal executive branch to waive
state obligation to comply with certain federal statutory and
administrative provisions so that the state may conduct a
demonstration project See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(aXSupp. ]11 993).
See generally Williams, supra note 5 (discussing the history of the
waiver provision and its use by the Clinton Administration to
undercut federal entitlements and particularly the AFDC program).
" See 42 U.S.A. § 615(aX1XA) (West 1997) (specifying that if
the state chooses to continue the waiver, the amendments to the
Social Security Act made by the PRWORA shall not apply to the
state before the expiration of the waiver "to the extent such
amendments are inconsistent with the waiver"). Waivers granted
prior to August 22, 1996, the date of the PRWORA's enactment,
have the ability of overriding virtually all of the PRWORA
provisions, including work participation requirements, the only
exception pertains to certain child care rules. Waiver applications
pending onithe date of enactment but granted prior to July 1, 1997
may override inconsistent PRWORA provisions except for the work
participation rules if the state demonstrates that the waiver is cost-
neutral to the federal treasury. Applicable technical requirements
are codified at 42 U.S.CA § 615 (West 1997)and scattered
sections therein.
97 Connecticeut's State Plan provides an example, and may be
found at I the State of Connecticut Governmental Website
<http'/ww v.dss.state.ctuswelbre.html>.
9 For a detailed examination of state waivers and considerations
as to their continuance, including the thicket of legal questions
surrounding when a waiver provision is "inconsistent" with the
PRWORAi see Mark Greenberg & Steve Savner, Waivers and the
New Welfahe Law: Initial Approaches in State Plans (Nov. 1996),
<http'J/www.epn.org/clasp/newwelfhtml>.
99 See H-IHS Policy Announcement, supra note 88.
... In the BBS Policy Announcement supra note 88, at 2, HHS
clarified the discretion it would accord states in fashioning
programs that qualify for MOE purposes, and stated some concerns
about states using segregated programs to undercut the work
participatidn requirements. No interpretive rules have yet been
issued, however, and the HHS' announcement generally takes the
position that only violations of the express statutory provisions will
cause a state to incur penalties until the rules are issued, and that
the rules will have a prospective effect only. Elsewhere, BHS
affirms thdt it desires to "encourage states to implement effective
and innovative program designs... which will produce the best
outcomes for families .... Before federal regulations are in effect
states will not be subject to penalties under the new law so long as
they implement programs which are related to the intent of the
statute and operate within a reasonable interpretation of the
statutory language. Id. at 4.
'0' BHS Policy Announcement, supra note 88.
102 For instance, the City of New York filed an Equal Protection
Clause challenge to parts of Title IV governing the provisions of
benefits to legal immigrants, but the district court held that under
the rational relation standard of review, the City failed to establish a
violation. See Abreu v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y.
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1997). For an overview of the likely Equal Protection violations
embedded in Title IV, see Welfare Refonnm-Treatment of Legal
Immignms-Congress Authorizes States to Deny Public Benefits to
Noncitizens and Excludes Legal Immignmts fom Federal Aid
Progrmis, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1191 (1997). Another individual
rights theory of relief that predicated upon the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, was explored in detail in Jonathan Romberg, Is
There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FoRDHAMURB. L.1 1051
(1995) (evaluating provisions of earlier versions of the Personal
Responsibility Act many of which were enacted, and concluding
they are constitutionally insufficient).
103 See Shvartsman v. Callahan, 1997 WL 573404 (N.D. 11. Sept
11, 1997) (ruling that the PRWORA did not violate plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment rights to due process for terminating the eligibility of
lawful permanent aliens to certain federally assisted public
benefits); Abreau v. Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(evaluating claims raised by the New York City and a class of
individual lawful permanent resident aliens, and ruling inter alia,
that the PRWORA did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
104 U.S. CoNST. Art. L § 8, cl. 1 (confering the power on Congress
to "lay and collect Taxes... ., to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States").
o See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling,
inter alia, that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from
forcing states to take title to nuclear waste as a penalty for
noncompliance with the federal effort to establish low-level
radioactive waste facilities); accord Printz v. U.S., 117 S.Ct 2365
(1997)(interpreting and applying the New York decision,
invalidating the Brady Act's commands to states). See also,
Seminole Tribes v. Florida, 116 S.Ct 1114 (1996Xruling Congress
lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to waive states'
immunity to federal court jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995Xinvalidating federal legislation as beyond exceeding the
permissible range of the Commerce power); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991Xdiscussing the constitutional values of
federalism).
'0' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling,
inter alia, that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from
forcing states to take title to nuclear waste as a penalty for
noncompliance with the federal effort to establish low-level
radioactive waste facilities); accord Printz v. U.S., 117 S.Ct 2365
(1997)(interpreting and applying the New York decision,
invalidating the Brady Act's commands to states). See also,
Seminole Tribes v. Florida, 116 S.Ct 1114 (1996Xruling Congress
lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to waive states'
immunity to federal court jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995Xinvalidating federal legislation as beyond exceeding the
permissible range of the Commerce power); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991Xdiscussing the constitutional values of
federalism).
107 The Tenth Amendment provides 'The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST., amend. X.
10s See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Darby v. United
States, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
'09 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
10 Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health
Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21
HASTNGs CONsT. L. Q. 489, 543 (1994).
I. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
112 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158.
113 In Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct 2365 (1997), the Court
reaffirmed New York and struck down portions of the Brady Act
which mandated certain activities for local police officers.
114 Although the federal Act at issue in New York was technically a
conditional federal grant program pursuant to the Spending Clause,
the Petitioners did not present a constitutional challenge to the
existing Spending Clause doctrine. Rather, they raised a technical
question of whether the release of trust funds held i escrow for the
states could properly be evaluated as a conditional grant under the
spending power. New York, 505 U.S.144, 172. The Court
answered in a cursory fashion that no constitutional infirmities
resulted from the escrow technicality, but thereby left unanswered
questions of how the Tenth Amendment might affect the operative
scoipe of the Spending Clause.
11 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting
StewardMach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,590 (1937)).
16 The four-part test requires that (1) the federal expenditure be
for the general welfare; (2) the conditions imposed on the states'
receipt of the Federal grant be unambiguous, (3) "the conditions
imposed are reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure";
and (4) the conditions imposed by the Federal act do not violate any
independent constitutional provision. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S.
at 172; South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (1987).
117 Some states have continued to demonstrate concern via
litigation that some constitutional limits should be recognized and
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enforced to reduce the coercion of federal conditional grant
programs. For instance, Nevada brought in an attempt to have the
federally-mandated 55 miles per hour highway speed limit
invalidated as unconstitutionally coercive, as noncompliance barred
it from the Highway Trust Fund, and 95% of Nevada's annual
highway budget was derived. In response, the Ninth Circuit held it
was unable to fashion a "principled definition" of unconstitutional
"coercion." See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 n.5 (9th Cir.
1989). The Ninth Circuit and commentators have agreed that a
coercion inquiry is unworkable. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1420
(1989); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1122-23 (1987).
"" See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Barkng Dog, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 877 (1996).
119 117 S.Ct. 2365.
120 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling,
inter alia, that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from
forcing states to take title to nuclear waste as a penalty for
noncompliance with the federal effort to establish low-level
radioactive waste facilities); accord Printz v. U.S., 117 S.Ct 2365
(1997)(interpreting and applying the New York decision,
invalidating the Brady Act's commands to states). See also,
Seminole Tribes v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996Xruling Congress
lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to waive states'
immunity to federal court jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995Xinvalidating federal legislation as beyond exceeding the
permissible range of the Commerce power); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991Xdiscussing the constitutional values of
federalism).
121 For instance, in Printz, the Court stated that other federal acts
that require the participation of State officials in
implementing Federal regulatory schemes can perhaps
be more accurately described as conditions upon the
grant of federal funding than as mandates to the states.
• . . We of course do not address these of other
currently operative enactments that are not before us; it
will be time enough to do so if and when their validity
is challenged in a proper case.
Printz, 117 S.Ct at 2376.
122 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1911, 1916 (1995).
123 id.
124 Id. at 1962-65.
125 Id. at 1967.
126 42 U.S.CA § 602(aX2) (West 1997).
127 See Sheri Steisel, Testimony on Behalf of the National
Conference of State Legislatures Regarding Implementation of PL
104-193, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Hwnan Resources (Sept 17,
1996) <http'J/www.ncsl.org/statefed/testimony/weltes96.hm.
'2 See New York, 505 U.S 144,206.
[
129 Baker, supra note 122, at 1916.
130 See, e.g1 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1997).
131 See id.
132 Given that no case since the New Deal has held Congress to
have transgressed the limits of the Spending Power, no direct
authority exists as to what types of parties are empowered to bring
Spending Power challenges. Taxpayer standing is generally
unavailable for challenging the federal government's exercise of its
powers. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The
best party for initiation of this revisiting of established precedent
would be a state, for it can also invoke the background values of the
Tenth Amendment inspiring the new federalism precedent See
generally Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National
Health Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles,
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 545-49 (1994).
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